feat(ai-secure-mcp): self-hostable secure MCP server on an extracted ai-isolate base #2157
- packages/ai-isolate-quickjs/package.json line 61Outdated@@ -58,4 +58,4 @@5858 "quickjs-emscripten": "^0.31.0"5959 },6060 "peerDependencies": {61- "@tanstack/ai-code-mode": "workspace:^"61+ "@tanstack/ai-isolate": "workspace:^"
jherr changed the title
- packages/ai-secure-mcp/README.md lines 86 to 87Outdated@@ -0,0 +67,21 @@67+ egress: ['https://api.hue.local'], // deny-by-default allowlist68+ policy: {69+ scopes: { setLights: 'control' }, // setLights needs the control scope70+ approve: ['buyMovie'], // buyMovie needs two-phase approval71+ },72+ audit: { path: './audit.jsonl', retentionDays: 90 },73+ notify: ntfyNotifier({ topic: 'my-home-mcp' }),74+ funnel: { port: 8787 },75+})76+77+// Serve it from your HTTP handler.78+export default server.fetch79+```80+81+`server.preflight` holds the secure-default problems. `server.tailscale` holds82+the command to expose the server when you pass `funnel`.83+84+## Reaching the network from a tool85+86+A tool receives the `egress` capability on `ctx.context`. It is the only way to87+the network, and it refuses any origin not on the allowlist.packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/approval.ts line 55Outdated@@ -0,0 +35,21 @@35+ pendingCount: () => number36+}37+38+export function createApprovalStore(options?: {39+ /** How long a proposal stays valid, 300000 ms (5 minutes) by default. */40+ ttlMs?: number41+ /** A clock in ms, for tests. */42+ now?: () => number43+ /** An id source, for tests. */44+ newId?: () => string45+}): ApprovalStore {46+ const ttlMs = options?.ttlMs ?? 300_00047+ const now = options?.now ?? (() => Date.now())48+ const newId = options?.newId ?? (() => randomUUID())49+ const proposals = new Map<string, Proposal>()50+51+ return {52+ propose: ({ owner, summary, run }) => {53+ const proposalId = newId()54+ const expiresAt = now() + ttlMs55+ proposals.set(proposalId, { owner, summary, run, expiresAt })packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/audit.ts lines 39 to 40Outdated@@ -0,0 +20,21 @@20+/**21+ * Keeps only id-like and query-like fields; everything else is redacted. The22+ * match is a suffix, so camelCase (`movieId`) and snake_case (`movie_id`) both23+ * count.24+ */25+const KEEP = /(id|ids|query|q|name|title|kind|type|scope|origin)$/i26+27+/**28+ * Redacts tool input to id-like and query-like fields. A non-object becomes a29+ * type tag. This keeps a useful trail without storing a secret value.30+ */31+export function redactArgs(args: unknown): unknown {32+ if (args === null || typeof args !== 'object') {33+ return args === undefined ? undefined : `[${typeof args}]`34+ }35+ if (Array.isArray(args)) return '[array]'36+ const out: Record<string, unknown> = {}37+ for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(args as Record<string, unknown>)) {38+ out[key] =39+ KEEP.test(key) && (typeof value === 'string' || typeof value === 'number')40+ ? valuepackages/ai-secure-mcp/src/audit.ts line 65Outdated@@ -0,0 +45,21 @@45+46+export interface AuditLog {47+ record: (entry: AuditEntry) => Promise<void>48+}49+50+/**51+ * An append-only JSONL audit log. Each line is one event with a timestamp and52+ * redacted args. On start it drops lines older than `retentionDays`.53+ *54+ * @param options.path - The JSONL file to append to55+ * @param options.retentionDays - Days to keep; older lines are pruned on start56+ * @param options.now - A clock in ms, for tests57+ */58+export function createAuditLog(options: {59+ path: string60+ retentionDays?: number61+ now?: () => number62+}): AuditLog {63+ const now = options.now ?? (() => Date.now())64+ // Prune and ensure the directory on first write, once.65+ const ready = (async () => {packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/auth.ts line 28Outdated@@ -0,0 +8,21 @@8+ * presented token.9+ */10+export function hashToken(token: string): string {11+ return createHash('sha256').update(token, 'utf8').digest('hex')12+}13+14+/**15+ * Compares two hex strings in constant time. Returns false for a length16+ * mismatch. Use it so a timing side channel cannot reveal the token.17+ */18+export function constantTimeEqual(a: string, b: string): boolean {19+ const left = Buffer.from(a, 'utf8')20+ const right = Buffer.from(b, 'utf8')21+ if (left.length !== right.length) return false22+ return timingSafeEqual(left, right)23+}24+25+/** Reads the bearer token from an `Authorization` header value. */26+export function bearerToken(header: string | null): string | undefined {27+ if (header === null) return undefined28+ const match = /^Bearer (.+)$/.exec(header.trim())packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/clients-file.ts line 26Outdated@@ -0,0 +6,21 @@6+ return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null7+}8+9+function toClient(value: unknown, index: number): ClientRecord {10+ if (11+ !isRecord(value) ||12+ typeof value.id !== 'string' ||13+ typeof value.tokenHash !== 'string' ||14+ !Array.isArray(value.scopes)15+ ) {16+ throw new SecureMcpError(17+ 'invalid_input',18+ `Client at index ${index} needs id, tokenHash, and scopes.`,19+ )20+ }21+ const client: ClientRecord = {22+ id: value.id,23+ tokenHash: value.tokenHash,24+ scopes: value.scopes.filter((s): s is string => typeof s === 'string'),25+ }26+ if (Array.isArray(value.targets)) {packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/clients-file.ts line 31Outdated@@ -0,0 +11,21 @@11+ !isRecord(value) ||12+ typeof value.id !== 'string' ||13+ typeof value.tokenHash !== 'string' ||14+ !Array.isArray(value.scopes)15+ ) {16+ throw new SecureMcpError(17+ 'invalid_input',18+ `Client at index ${index} needs id, tokenHash, and scopes.`,19+ )20+ }21+ const client: ClientRecord = {22+ id: value.id,23+ tokenHash: value.tokenHash,24+ scopes: value.scopes.filter((s): s is string => typeof s === 'string'),25+ }26+ if (Array.isArray(value.targets)) {27+ client.targets = value.targets.filter(28+ (t): t is string => typeof t === 'string',29+ )30+ }31+ if (typeof value.expiresAt === 'number') {packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/egress.ts line 65Outdated@@ -0,0 +45,21 @@45+ return async (url, init) => {46+ let origin: string47+ try {48+ origin = new URL(url).origin49+ } catch {50+ throw new SecureMcpError('invalid_input', `Not a URL: ${url}`)51+ }52+ if (!allowed.has(origin)) {53+ options.onDenied?.(origin)54+ throw new SecureMcpError(55+ 'egress_denied',56+ `Egress to ${origin} is not on the allowlist.`,57+ )58+ }59+ const controller = new AbortController()60+ const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs)61+ try {62+ return await fetchImpl(url, {63+ ...init,64+ redirect: 'error',65+ signal: controller.signal,packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/egress.ts line 74Outdated@@ -0,0 +54,21 @@54+ throw new SecureMcpError(55+ 'egress_denied',56+ `Egress to ${origin} is not on the allowlist.`,57+ )58+ }59+ const controller = new AbortController()60+ const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs)61+ try {62+ return await fetchImpl(url, {63+ ...init,64+ redirect: 'error',65+ signal: controller.signal,66+ })67+ } catch (error) {68+ const detail = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'request failed'69+ throw new SecureMcpError(70+ 'backend_unavailable',71+ `Egress to ${origin} failed: ${detail}`,72+ )73+ } finally {74+ clearTimeout(timer)packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/guard.ts line 79Outdated@@ -0,0 +59,21 @@59+ const client = readClient(context)60+61+ const scope = deps.policy.scopes?.[tool.name]62+ if (scope !== undefined && !client.scopes.includes(scope)) {63+ return refuse(deps, client, tool.name, args, 'forbidden_scope', `This token does not hold the "${scope}" scope.`)64+ }65+66+ const targetField = deps.policy.targetParam?.[tool.name]67+ if (targetField !== undefined && client.targets !== undefined) {68+ const value = isRecord(args) ? args[targetField] : undefined69+ if (!client.targets.includes(String(value))) {70+ return refuse(deps, client, tool.name, args, 'forbidden_scope', 'This token may not reach that target.')71+ }72+ }73+74+ if (deps.policy.approve?.includes(tool.name)) {75+ const summary = deps.summarize(tool.name, args)76+ const envelope = deps.approvals.propose({77+ owner: client.id,78+ summary,79+ run: async () => original?.(args, context),packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/server.ts line 110Outdated@@ -0,0 +90,21 @@90+ let egressTimeoutMs: number | undefined91+ if (config.egress !== undefined) {92+ if ('allow' in config.egress) {93+ allow = config.egress.allow94+ egressTimeoutMs = config.egress.timeoutMs95+ } else {96+ allow = config.egress97+ }98+ }99+ const egress = createEgress({100+ allow,101+ ...(egressTimeoutMs === undefined ? {} : { timeoutMs: egressTimeoutMs }),102+ onDenied: (origin) => void notify.notify({ kind: 'egress_denied', origin }),103+ })104+105+ const policy: AccessPolicy = config.policy ?? {}106+ const approvals = createApprovalStore(config.approval)107+ const summarize =108+ config.summarize ?? ((toolName: string) => `Run ${toolName}`)109+110+ const guarded = guardTools(config.tools, {packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/server.ts line 151Outdated@@ -0,0 +131,21 @@131+ : createRateLimiter(config.rateLimit ?? { limit: 60, windowMs: 60_000 })132+133+ const check = preflight({134+ clients: config.clients,135+ egressDenyByDefault: allow.length > 0,136+ auditOn: audit !== undefined,137+ notifierOn: config.notify !== undefined,138+ })139+ if (config.funnel?.public === true && !check.ok) {140+ throw new SecureMcpError(141+ 'invalid_input',142+ `Refusing to expose a public funnel. Fix: ${check.problems.join(' ')}`,143+ )144+ }145+146+ const nowSeconds = () => Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)147+148+ const fetch = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {149+ const token = bearerToken(request.headers.get('authorization'))150+ if (token === undefined) {151+ void notify.notify({ kind: 'auth_failure' })packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/server.ts line 187Outdated@@ -0,0 +167,21 @@167+ if (rl !== undefined && !rl.allow(client.id)) {168+ void notify.notify({ kind: 'rate_limited', client: client.id })169+ await audit?.record({170+ client: client.id,171+ event: 'rate_limited',172+ outcome: 'denied',173+ })174+ return jsonError(429, 'rate_limited')175+ }176+177+ const authInfo: AuthInfo = {178+ token: '[redacted]',179+ clientId: client.id,180+ scopes: client.scopes,181+ expiresAt: client.expiresAt ?? FAR_FUTURE,182+ extra: {},183+ }184+185+ return inner.handle(request, {186+ authInfo,187+ context: { secure: { client }, egress },
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packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/guard.ts line 93Outdated@@ -0,0 +73,21 @@73+74+ if (deps.policy.approve?.includes(tool.name)) {75+ const summary = deps.summarize(tool.name, args)76+ const envelope = deps.approvals.propose({77+ owner: client.id,78+ summary,79+ run: async () => original?.(args, context),80+ })81+ await deps.audit?.record({82+ client: client.id,83+ event: 'tool_proposed',84+ tool: tool.name,85+ outcome: 'ok',86+ args,87+ })88+ void deps.notify.notify({89+ kind: 'approval_pending',90+ proposalId: envelope.proposalId,91+ summary,92+ })93+ return envelopepackages/ai-secure-mcp/src/clients-file.ts line 26Outdated@@ -0,0 +6,21 @@6+ return typeof value === 'object' && value !== null7+}8+9+function toClient(value: unknown, index: number): ClientRecord {10+ if (11+ !isRecord(value) ||12+ typeof value.id !== 'string' ||13+ typeof value.tokenHash !== 'string' ||14+ !Array.isArray(value.scopes)15+ ) {16+ throw new SecureMcpError(17+ 'invalid_input',18+ `Client at index ${index} needs id, tokenHash, and scopes.`,19+ )20+ }21+ const client: ClientRecord = {22+ id: value.id,23+ tokenHash: value.tokenHash,24+ scopes: value.scopes.filter((s): s is string => typeof s === 'string'),25+ }26+ if (Array.isArray(value.targets)) {packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/clients-file.ts line 31Outdated@@ -0,0 +11,21 @@11+ !isRecord(value) ||12+ typeof value.id !== 'string' ||13+ typeof value.tokenHash !== 'string' ||14+ !Array.isArray(value.scopes)15+ ) {16+ throw new SecureMcpError(17+ 'invalid_input',18+ `Client at index ${index} needs id, tokenHash, and scopes.`,19+ )20+ }21+ const client: ClientRecord = {22+ id: value.id,23+ tokenHash: value.tokenHash,24+ scopes: value.scopes.filter((s): s is string => typeof s === 'string'),25+ }26+ if (Array.isArray(value.targets)) {27+ client.targets = value.targets.filter(28+ (t): t is string => typeof t === 'string',29+ )30+ }31+ if (typeof value.expiresAt === 'number') {packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/audit.ts line 25Outdated@@ -0,0 +5,21 @@5+export interface AuditEntry {6+ /** The client id, or undefined for an unauthenticated attempt. */7+ client?: string8+ /** What happened, for example `tool_call`, `auth_failure`, `egress_denied`. */9+ event: string10+ /** The tool name, when the event is a tool call. */11+ tool?: string12+ /** `ok`, `denied`, or `error`. */13+ outcome: string14+ /** The raw tool input. It is redacted before it is written. */15+ args?: unknown16+ /** The error code, when the outcome is an error. */17+ code?: string18+}19+20+/**21+ * Keeps only id-like and query-like fields; everything else is redacted. The22+ * match is a suffix, so camelCase (`movieId`) and snake_case (`movie_id`) both23+ * count.24+ */25+const KEEP = /(id|ids|query|q|name|title|kind|type|scope|origin)$/ipackages/ai-secure-mcp/src/approval.ts line 55Outdated@@ -0,0 +35,21 @@35+ pendingCount: () => number36+}37+38+export function createApprovalStore(options?: {39+ /** How long a proposal stays valid, 300000 ms (5 minutes) by default. */40+ ttlMs?: number41+ /** A clock in ms, for tests. */42+ now?: () => number43+ /** An id source, for tests. */44+ newId?: () => string45+}): ApprovalStore {46+ const ttlMs = options?.ttlMs ?? 300_00047+ const now = options?.now ?? (() => Date.now())48+ const newId = options?.newId ?? (() => randomUUID())49+ const proposals = new Map<string, Proposal>()50+51+ return {52+ propose: ({ owner, summary, run }) => {53+ const proposalId = newId()54+ const expiresAt = now() + ttlMs55+ proposals.set(proposalId, { owner, summary, run, expiresAt })packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/server.ts line 151Outdated@@ -0,0 +131,21 @@131+ : createRateLimiter(config.rateLimit ?? { limit: 60, windowMs: 60_000 })132+133+ const check = preflight({134+ clients: config.clients,135+ egressDenyByDefault: allow.length > 0,136+ auditOn: audit !== undefined,137+ notifierOn: config.notify !== undefined,138+ })139+ if (config.funnel?.public === true && !check.ok) {140+ throw new SecureMcpError(141+ 'invalid_input',142+ `Refusing to expose a public funnel. Fix: ${check.problems.join(' ')}`,143+ )144+ }145+146+ const nowSeconds = () => Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000)147+148+ const fetch = async (request: Request): Promise<Response> => {149+ const token = bearerToken(request.headers.get('authorization'))150+ if (token === undefined) {151+ void notify.notify({ kind: 'auth_failure' })packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/audit.ts line 65Outdated@@ -0,0 +45,21 @@45+46+export interface AuditLog {47+ record: (entry: AuditEntry) => Promise<void>48+}49+50+/**51+ * An append-only JSONL audit log. Each line is one event with a timestamp and52+ * redacted args. On start it drops lines older than `retentionDays`.53+ *54+ * @param options.path - The JSONL file to append to55+ * @param options.retentionDays - Days to keep; older lines are pruned on start56+ * @param options.now - A clock in ms, for tests57+ */58+export function createAuditLog(options: {59+ path: string60+ retentionDays?: number61+ now?: () => number62+}): AuditLog {63+ const now = options.now ?? (() => Date.now())64+ // Prune and ensure the directory on first write, once.65+ const ready = (async () => {packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/egress.ts line 65Outdated@@ -0,0 +45,21 @@45+ return async (url, init) => {46+ let origin: string47+ try {48+ origin = new URL(url).origin49+ } catch {50+ throw new SecureMcpError('invalid_input', `Not a URL: ${url}`)51+ }52+ if (!allowed.has(origin)) {53+ options.onDenied?.(origin)54+ throw new SecureMcpError(55+ 'egress_denied',56+ `Egress to ${origin} is not on the allowlist.`,57+ )58+ }59+ const controller = new AbortController()60+ const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs)61+ try {62+ return await fetchImpl(url, {63+ ...init,64+ redirect: 'error',65+ signal: controller.signal,packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/guard.ts line 159Outdated@@ -0,0 +139,21 @@139+ throw new SecureMcpError(code, message)140+}141+142+/**143+ * Builds the `approve_proposal` tool. A client confirms its own pending144+ * proposal by id; the stored action then runs host-side.145+ */146+export function createConfirmTool(deps: {147+ approvals: ApprovalStore148+ audit?: AuditLog149+}): AnyServerTool {150+ const tool: AnyServerTool = toolDefinition({151+ name: 'approve_proposal',152+ description:153+ 'Confirm a pending approval by its proposalId. Runs the proposed action.',154+ inputSchema: z.object({155+ proposalId: z.string().describe('The id from an approval_required reply.'),156+ }),157+ }).server<SecureRequestContext>(async ({ proposalId }, context) => {158+ const client = readClient(context)159+ const result = await deps.approvals.confirm(proposalId, client.id)packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/server.ts line 102Outdated@@ -0,0 +82,21 @@82+): SecureMcpServer {83+ const notify = config.notify ?? silentNotifier()84+ const audit: AuditLog | undefined =85+ config.audit === false || config.audit === undefined86+ ? undefined87+ : createAuditLog(config.audit)88+89+ let allow: ReadonlyArray<string> = []90+ let egressTimeoutMs: number | undefined91+ if (config.egress !== undefined) {92+ if ('allow' in config.egress) {93+ allow = config.egress.allow94+ egressTimeoutMs = config.egress.timeoutMs95+ } else {96+ allow = config.egress97+ }98+ }99+ const egress = createEgress({100+ allow,101+ ...(egressTimeoutMs === undefined ? {} : { timeoutMs: egressTimeoutMs }),102+ onDenied: (origin) => void notify.notify({ kind: 'egress_denied', origin }),packages/ai-secure-mcp/README.md line 86Outdated@@ -0,0 +66,21 @@66+ ],67+ egress: ['https://api.hue.local'], // deny-by-default allowlist68+ policy: {69+ scopes: { setLights: 'control' }, // setLights needs the control scope70+ approve: ['buyMovie'], // buyMovie needs two-phase approval71+ },72+ audit: { path: './audit.jsonl', retentionDays: 90 },73+ notify: ntfyNotifier({ topic: 'my-home-mcp' }),74+ funnel: { port: 8787 },75+})76+77+// Serve it from your HTTP handler.78+export default server.fetch79+```80+81+`server.preflight` holds the secure-default problems. `server.tailscale` holds82+the command to expose the server when you pass `funnel`.83+84+## Reaching the network from a tool85+86+A tool receives the `egress` capability on `ctx.context`. It is the only way togithub-actions[bot](GitHub profile, opens in a new tab) removed labelsmerge-conflicts
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- packages/ai-isolate-e2b/README.md line 30Outdated@@ -27,4 +27,4 @@2727 ## Installation28282929 ```bash30-pnpm add @tanstack/ai-isolate-e2b @tanstack/ai-code-mode e2b30+pnpm add @tanstack/ai-isolate-e2b @tanstack/ai-isolate e2bpackages/ai-secure-mcp/README.md line 32Outdated@@ -0,0 +12,21 @@12+ src="https://tanstack.com/api/readme/ai.png"13+ alt="TanStack AI"14+ width="900"15+ />16+ </picture>17+</div>18+19+<br />20+21+# @tanstack/ai-secure-mcp22+23+A security envelope around [`createMCPServer`](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@tanstack/ai-mcp)24+for a self-hoster who wants to expose a TanStack AI MCP server to the internet.25+26+It wraps your server with:27+28+**Hashed-token auth** — bearer tokens stored as SHA-256 hashes, constant-time compare.29+**Scopes and a target allowlist** — a token holds scopes; a scope can be narrowed to named resources.30+**Deny-by-default egress helper** — one allowlisted `egress` capability a tool uses on purpose. It is not an enforced network boundary: a tool that calls global `fetch` still reaches the network. For enforced isolation, run the server behind a separate execution or network boundary.31+**Rate limits** — a per-client sliding window.32+**A redacted audit log** — append-only JSONL, args redacted to id-like fields, no secrets.packages/ai-secure-mcp/README.md lines 117 to 119Outdated@@ -0,0 +99,21 @@99+ name: 'getLights',100+ description: 'List the lights on the Hue bridge',101+ inputSchema: z.object({}),102+}).server<SecureRequestContext>(async (_args, ctx) => {103+ const res = await ctx.context.egress('https://api.hue.local/lights')104+ return { status: res.status }105+})106+```107+108+## Two-phase approval109+110+A tool in `policy.approve` does not act on the first call. It returns an111+envelope:112+113+```json114+{ "status": "approval_required", "proposalId": "…", "summary": "Run buyMovie" }115+```116+117+A separate, authenticated call to the `approve_proposal` tool with that118+`proposalId` runs the action. Proposals are in memory, single-use, and expire,119+so a crash cannot leave a ghost approval.packages/ai-secure-mcp/README.md line 130Outdated@@ -0,0 +110,21 @@110+A tool in `policy.approve` does not act on the first call. It returns an111+envelope:112+113+```json114+{ "status": "approval_required", "proposalId": "…", "summary": "Run buyMovie" }115+```116+117+A separate, authenticated call to the `approve_proposal` tool with that118+`proposalId` runs the action. Proposals are in memory, single-use, and expire,119+so a crash cannot leave a ghost approval.120+121+## Secure defaults122+123+| Concern | Default | Footgun it prevents |124+| -------------- | ------------------------------------------------ | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |125+| Egress helper | deny-by-default allowlist | a tool exfiltrating data _when it uses `ctx.context.egress`_ |126+| Generic HTTP | not injected into the context | SSRF through a "helpful" tool _that reaches the network only through `egress`_ |127+| Tokens | hash-only, constant-time | replay from a leaked store |128+| Secrets | never in the audit log or a notification | prompt/response exfiltration |129+| Approval state | in memory, fail-closed on restart | a ghost approval after a crash |130+| Exposure | tailnet-only unless you opt into a public funnel | accidental internet |packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/audit.ts line 71Outdated@@ -0,0 +51,21 @@51+ record: (entry: AuditEntry) => Promise<void>52+}53+54+/**55+ * An append-only JSONL audit log. Each line is one event with a timestamp and56+ * redacted args. On start it drops lines older than `retentionDays`.57+ *58+ * @param options.path - The JSONL file to append to59+ * @param options.retentionDays - Days to keep; older lines are pruned on start60+ * @param options.now - A clock in ms, for tests61+ */62+export function createAuditLog(options: {63+ path: string64+ retentionDays?: number65+ now?: () => number66+}): AuditLog {67+ const now = options.now ?? (() => Date.now())68+ const init = async () => {69+ await mkdir(dirname(options.path), { recursive: true }).catch(() => {})70+ if (options.retentionDays === undefined) return71+ const cutoff = now() - options.retentionDays * 86_400_000packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/egress.ts line 62Outdated@@ -0,0 +42,21 @@42+ const fetchImpl = options.fetch ?? fetch43+44+ return async (url, init) => {45+ let origin: string46+ try {47+ origin = new URL(url).origin48+ } catch {49+ throw new SecureMcpError('invalid_input', `Not a URL: ${url}`)50+ }51+ if (!allowed.has(origin)) {52+ options.onDenied?.(origin)53+ throw new SecureMcpError(54+ 'egress_denied',55+ `Egress to ${origin} is not on the allowlist.`,56+ )57+ }58+ const controller = new AbortController()59+ // The deadline stays armed until the caller's combined signal settles, so it60+ // still aborts a slow body stream: `fetch` resolves on headers, not on body61+ // completion. The timer fires at most once and is cleared on cancellation.62+ const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs)packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/egress.ts line 79Outdated@@ -0,0 +59,21 @@59+ // The deadline stays armed until the caller's combined signal settles, so it60+ // still aborts a slow body stream: `fetch` resolves on headers, not on body61+ // completion. The timer fires at most once and is cleared on cancellation.62+ const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs)63+ // Combine the caller's signal with the timeout so caller cancellation still64+ // aborts the request and an already-aborted caller signal is honored,65+ // instead of replacing `init.signal` with a fresh active one.66+ const signal = combineSignals(init?.signal ?? undefined, controller.signal)67+ // Clear the timer once the operation can no longer time out: either the68+ // deadline fired, or the caller aborted, or the caller finished reading and69+ // dropped its reference (GC'd timer). Attach cleanup to the combined signal.70+ if (signal.aborted) {71+ clearTimeout(timer)72+ throw new SecureMcpError(73+ 'backend_unavailable',74+ `Egress to ${origin} failed: ${signal.reason instanceof Error ? signal.reason.message : 'aborted'}`,75+ )76+ }77+ signal.addEventListener('abort', () => clearTimeout(timer), { once: true })78+ try {79+ return await fetchImpl(url, {packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/egress.ts line 104Outdated@@ -0,0 +84,21 @@84+ } catch (error) {85+ clearTimeout(timer)86+ const detail = error instanceof Error ? error.message : 'request failed'87+ throw new SecureMcpError(88+ 'backend_unavailable',89+ `Egress to ${origin} failed: ${detail}`,90+ )91+ }92+ }93+}94+95+/** Combines abort signals; aborts the result when any input aborts. */96+function combineSignals(97+ a: AbortSignal | undefined,98+ b: AbortSignal,99+): AbortSignal {100+ if (a === undefined) return b101+ // `AbortSignal.any` is available on every runtime this package targets102+ // (Node 18.17+, modern browsers). It aborts as soon as either input aborts103+ // and carries the first abort reason.104+ return AbortSignal.any([a, b])
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- packages/ai-secure-mcp/README.md line 126Outdated@@ -0,0 +106,21 @@106+```107+108+## Two-phase approval109+110+A tool in `policy.approve` does not act on the first call. It returns an111+envelope:112+113+```json114+{ "status": "approval_required", "proposalId": "…", "summary": "Run buyMovie" }115+```116+117+A separate, authenticated call to the `approve_proposal` tool with that118+`proposalId` runs the action. Proposals are in memory, single-use, and expire,119+so a crash cannot leave a ghost approval.120+121+The confirm step checks only that the confirming client id matches the client122+that made the proposal. It is not an independent approver: the same client, with123+the same token, can make both the proposal and the confirm. This two-phase flow124+adds a deliberate second step and an audit trail; it does not by itself prove a125+human reviewed the action. For real human-in-the-loop approval, route the126+confirm through a different client or an out-of-band channel.packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/egress.ts line 83Outdated@@ -0,0 +63,21 @@63+ // the event loop open on its own, so a completed request can let the process64+ // exit without waiting out the remaining `timeoutMs`.65+ const timer = setTimeout(() => controller.abort(), timeoutMs)66+ timer.unref?.()67+ // Combine the caller's signal with the timeout so caller cancellation still68+ // aborts the request and an already-aborted caller signal is honored,69+ // instead of replacing `init.signal` with a fresh active one.70+ const signal = combineSignals(init?.signal ?? undefined, controller.signal)71+ // Clear the timer once the operation can no longer time out: either the72+ // deadline fired, or the caller aborted, or the caller finished reading and73+ // dropped its reference (GC'd timer). Attach cleanup to the combined signal.74+ if (signal.aborted) {75+ clearTimeout(timer)76+ throw new SecureMcpError(77+ 'backend_unavailable',78+ `Egress to ${origin} failed: ${signal.reason instanceof Error ? signal.reason.message : 'aborted'}`,79+ )80+ }81+ signal.addEventListener('abort', () => clearTimeout(timer), { once: true })82+ const fail = (error: unknown): SecureMcpError => {83+ clearTimeout(timer)packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/egress.ts line 162Outdated@@ -0,0 +142,21 @@142+}143+144+/** Combines abort signals; aborts the result when any input aborts. */145+function combineSignals(146+ a: AbortSignal | undefined,147+ b: AbortSignal,148+): AbortSignal {149+ if (a === undefined) return b150+ // `AbortSignal.any` is the fast path, but `engines.node` allows 18.16 where151+ // it does not exist yet (added in 18.17). The lib types assume it is always152+ // present, so guard with a runtime check and fall back to a manual combiner153+ // so a caller signal on an older runtime does not throw before fetch runs.154+ if (typeof AbortSignal.any === 'function') return AbortSignal.any([a, b])155+ const controller = new AbortController()156+ const abort = (reason: unknown) => controller.abort(reason)157+ for (const s of [a, b]) {158+ if (s.aborted) {159+ abort(s.reason)160+ break161+ }162+ s.addEventListener('abort', () => abort(s.reason), { once: true })packages/ai-secure-mcp/tests/egress.test.ts line 92Outdated@@ -0,0 +72,21 @@72+ const controller = new AbortController()73+ await egress('https://api.hue.local/x', { signal: controller.signal })74+ expect(seen).toBeInstanceOf(AbortSignal)75+ expect(seen?.aborted).toBe(false)76+ // A later caller abort propagates to the signal fetch received.77+ controller.abort()78+ expect(seen?.aborted).toBe(true)79+ })80+81+ it('unrefs the deadline timer so a completed request does not hold the loop', async () => {82+ let timer: { unref?: () => void } | undefined83+ const spy = vi.spyOn(global, 'setTimeout')84+ const egress = createEgress({85+ allow: ['https://api.hue.local'],86+ fetch: async () => new Response('body'),87+ })88+ await egress('https://api.hue.local/x')89+ timer = spy.mock.results[0]?.value90+ // Node timers expose `unref`; it must have been called so a finished91+ // request cannot delay process exit by the remaining timeout.92+ expect(typeof timer?.unref).toBe('function')
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Walkthrough
The pull request adds
@tanstack/ai-isolateas the shared home for isolate contracts andwrapCode, then updates Code Mode and six drivers to use or re-export it. It also adds@tanstack/ai-secure-mcp, with authentication, tool access controls, approvals, audit logging, notifications, rate limiting, and deployment checks.Changes: Isolate Contract Extraction
packages/ai-isolate/*,.changeset/extract-ai-isolate-contract.mdwrapCodeexport. Adds package configuration and README documentation.packages/ai-code-mode/package.json,packages/ai-code-mode/src/index.ts,packages/ai-code-mode/src/types.tswrapCodeand isolate types from@tanstack/ai-isolate.packages/ai-isolate-cloudflare/*,packages/ai-isolate-daytona/*,packages/ai-isolate-e2b/*,packages/ai-isolate-node/*,packages/ai-isolate-quickjs-bun/*,packages/ai-isolate-quickjs/*@tanstack/ai-isolate.Secure MCP Server
packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/types.ts,packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/index.ts,packages/ai-secure-mcp/package.json,packages/ai-secure-mcp/tsconfig.json,packages/ai-secure-mcp/vite.config.ts,packages/ai-secure-mcp/README.md,.changeset/add-ai-secure-mcp.mdpackages/ai-secure-mcp/src/auth.ts,packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/clients-file.ts,packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/egress.ts,packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/rate-limit.ts,packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/guard.ts,packages/ai-secure-mcp/tests/*packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/approval.ts,packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/audit.ts,packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/notifier.ts,packages/ai-secure-mcp/tests/approval.test.ts,packages/ai-secure-mcp/tests/audit.test.ts,packages/ai-secure-mcp/tests/notifier.test.tspackages/ai-secure-mcp/src/server.ts,packages/ai-secure-mcp/src/deploy.ts,packages/ai-secure-mcp/tests/server.test.ts,packages/ai-secure-mcp/tests/deploy.test.tsEstimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~50 minutes
Change: Feature
Sequence Diagram(s)#
Suggested reviewers:
alemtuzlakMerge Risk:
Moderate · previous review
2cb0cThe package adds a security-focused MCP server with several unresolved hardening and documentation gaps, mainly around egress enforcement, audit and notification handling, and example configuration. These should be addressed or explicitly accepted before merge. Rollback is a simple revert.
Pre-merge checks:
4
@tanstack/ai-secure-mcp), and mentions the extractedai-isolatebase, which the PR also adds. It follows the convent…Full details: Title check
Explanation
The title names the main change, a new self-hostable secure MCP server package (
@tanstack/ai-secure-mcp), and mentions the extractedai-isolatebase, which the PR also adds. It follows the conventional commit style and is one line of plain text. The title covers the main change without listing files.Full details: Description check
Explanation
The description follows the template. It has the Changes section, the full checklist, and the Release Impact section. It explains the two new packages and the isolate extraction, the reason for the refactor, the test commands and results, a manual test path, a rollback plan, and the public API change. The checklist marks docs, tests, and changeset as done. The description also states that the live E2B and Daytona tests were not run, and it defers two follow-up items. The template items are complete and the description is specific.
Finishing Touches
Generate unit tests (beta)
Fix failing CI checks
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